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Abstract
We use unique business register data for the United Kingdom to investigate the effects
of different forms of firm expansion and contraction on firm-level performance indicators
such as wages and productivity. We distinguish between adjustment of employment and
turnover at existing establishments, expansions and contractions taking place via greenfield
investment and disinvestment, and via acquisitions and sell-offs. We show that the choice of
adjustment channel has important implications for the evolution of firm-level performance
indicators. In terms of aggregate importance, we demonstrate that the two external ad-
justment forms (greenfield and M&A) account for at least 50% of the changes in aggregate
wages, profits and productivity associated with firm expansions and contractions.
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1 Introduction
Firms constantly adapt to changes in their market environment through changes in the scale
and scope of their operations. The magnitude and consequences of the resulting micro-level
adjustments have been extensively documented in the literature (see Davis et al., 2006, for a
recent overview). Building on these empirical facts, a number of theoretical models have been
developed over the past decades which have significantly improved our understanding of the
growth processes of individual firms and how these map into aggregates such as industry-level
employment, productivity or firm size distributions (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992;
Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; Asplund and Nocke, 2006).
In recent research (Breinlich, Niemann and Solomon, 2010), we have argued that only little
attention has been paid to the channels through which firm growth and contractions take
place. Using unique business register data for the United Kingdom, we presented a novel set
of stylised facts related to how expanding and contracting firms choose between adjustments
of employment or output at existing production facilities (“internal adjustment”), the opening
or closure of entire establishments or divisions (“greenfield investment/disinvestment”) and
the buying and selling of parts or the entirety of their operations (“mergers and acquisitions“,
M&As). We showed that all three channels are quantitatively important in explaining aggregate
firm growth and that firms choose between the available adjustment channels in clearly defined
patterns, with basic variables such as initial firm size having substantial explanatory power in
predicting a firm’s choice.
In the present paper, we extend our earlier research and investigate the consequences of
choosing one particular channel over another for firm-level variables such as wages or pro-
ductivity. We present evidence that is suggestive of the choice of adjustment channel having
important economic implications, both for the adjusting firm and for aggregate economic ac-
tivity. For example, we show that plants which see their employment reduced, are sold off, or
are closed down, subsequently show a number of negative performance characteristics, such as
low productivity and profitability. Interestingly, while we find only weak evidence that M&As
improve the productivity of acquired plants and basically leave firm-level productivity of the
acquirer unchanged, we show that internal expansions actually lead to significant productivity
reductions of the expanding firm. In terms of aggregate importance, we demonstrate that the
two external adjustment forms (greenfield and M&A) account for at least 50% of the changes
in aggregate wages, profits and productivity associated with firm expansions and contractions.
As we discuss below, these findings have potentially important implications for the design of
economic policy and the modelling of firm adjustment processes.
Our research relates most closely to contributions in industrial organisation and corporate
finance. In industrial economics, a large number of papers have analysed the role of plant-level
adjustments in explaining aggregate productivity growth (e.g., Disney et al., 2003; Foster et al.,
2006). Because of their explicit and intentional focus on plants, however, the resulting findings
are only of limited value for understanding the expansion and contraction decisions of firms
and for how firm-level variables such as productivity are shaped by the choice of adjustment
channel. Looking at the firm-level also allows to investigate additional issues such as the effect
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of the choice of adjustment channel on a firm’s incumbent plants.
In the corporate finance literature, researchers such as Jensen (1993) have previously argued
that M&As present a more efficient form of resource transfer between expanding and contracting
firms than bankruptcies or internal adjustment. However, we are not aware of any research that
provides systematic evidence for or against this claim. There is of course a large literature on the
consequences of mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Schoar, 2002)
but these consequences are never compared to the effect of alternative forms of expansion or
contraction such as internal adjustment or greenfield investment. Indeed, our comparisons of
M&A and internal expansions show that the choice of an appropriate control group is essential
for correctly estimating the effects of mergers and acquisitions on productivity and other firm-
level variables as well.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data and methodology
in more detail. Section 3, the core section of this paper, looks at the changes in firm-level vari-
ables such as wages or productivity associated with the choice of adjustment channel. Section
4 concludes.
2 Description of Data and Methodology
We use two sources of firm- and establishment-level data for the United Kingdom for the pe-
riod between 1997 and 2005, both of which are maintained by the Office for National Statistics
(ONS). The first is the Business Structure Database (BSD) which covers essentially the entire
British economy, accounting for 99% of aggregate employment and turnover. The second data-
base we use is the Annual Respondents Database (ARD). The ARD is based on a stratified
sample of over 40,000 UK private sector companies per year and contains a large number of
variables not available in the BSD, such as wages, investment and intermediate inputs. We
will use information from the BSD to identify which adjustment channels firms use. We then
merge the ARD with the newly constructed identifiers and look at the changes at the firm-level
associated with the choice of adjustment channel.
2.1 The Business Structure Database (BSD)
The BSD is constructed from annual snapshots of the UK’s business register, the Interdepart-
mental Business Register (IDBR). For each year between 1997 and 2005, it contains the universe
of British companies which were either registered for Value Added Tax (VAT) purposes or op-
erated a Pay as You Earn (PAYE) income tax scheme. In 2005 the BSD was comprised of
2.2 million live enterprises, representing an estimated 99% of economic activity in terms of
employment and turnover (ONS, 2006).
The BSD captures the ownership structure of firms, plants and business sites that make
up the British economy using three aggregation categories: the enterprise, enterprise group
and local unit. According to the official definition (ONS, 2006), an enterprise “is the smallest
combination of legal units that is an organisational unit producing goods or services, which
benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of
its current resources”. An enterprise group is “an association of enterprises bound together
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by legal and/or financial links”. Finally, a local unit is “an enterprise or part thereof (e.g., a
workshop, factory, warehouse or office) situated in a geographically identified place”.
Upon entry into the IDBR, each local unit, enterprise and enterprise group is allocated a
unique reference number which remains with the unit for as long as it stays on the register.
Furthermore, the ONS maintains a list of local units for each enterprise and combines enterprises
to form enterprise groups by using information from Dun and Bradstreet, supplemented by the
VAT system (ONS, 2006). Thus, every local unit also has an enterprise reference and every
enterprise an enterprise group reference number.
Taken together, these identifiers allow the analysis of demographic events over time. We
have developed an algorithm to identify these events, following a general typology provided by
Eurostat (European Commission, 2003). In our methodology, the most basic event is a change
in employment at a continuing enterprise (“internal adjustment”). This is easily observed from
the entries of two adjacent years for the same enterprise.1 If an enterprise identifier disappears
from the data, we code this as an enterprise exit (“greenfield disinvestment”). Likewise, the
appearance of a new identifier is coded as a firm entry (“greenfield investment”). Finally, the
combination of enterprise and enterprise group references allows for the analysis of ownership
changes. For example, if enterprise group A buys enterprise 1 from enterprise group B, the
enterprise reference number of enterprise 1 would remain unchanged but its enterprise group
identifier would change from A to B. Of course, an enterprise group can carry out several or all of
these activities in a given year. For example, it might expand employment at one of its existing
enterprises, create a new enterprise via greenfield investment and buy another one from another
enterprise group (“M&A expansion”). Table 1 provides a summary of these definitions.2
Our methodology can be implemented at different levels of aggregation. In this paper, we
take the enterprise group as the decision-making unit and analyse how it changes employment
through adjustments at its existing enterprises and the acquisition/sale or creation/closure of
new ones. Given that many of the expansion and contraction decisions we are interested in here
are of first-order importance to a firm, it seems likely that they are made centrally and at the
highest level of a firm.3
Another reason for working at the enterprise group/enterprise level (rather than at the
enterprise group/local unit or enterprise/local unit level) is that there are a number of important
data issues related to the local unit level of the BSD. First, the local unit structure of enterprises
is updated much less frequently than the links between enterprise groups and enterprises, in
particular for smaller enterprises.4 This makes an implementation of the above methodology
1Note that we use information on employment rather than turnover (which is also available in the BSD) to
classify internal adjustments into expansions and contractions. This is because the former is much more directly
under the control of the firm than the latter.
2Note that we are not using the indicators of demographic events contained in the BSD itself. While these are
also based on the typology outlined in European Commission (2003), there are a large number of inconsistencies
in the preliminary version available so far.
3This is particularly true for the two external forms of adjustment, greenfield investment and M&As. While
enterprises are defined above as “benefiting from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making in the allocation
of current resources”, this definition does not include strategic investment decisions such as the acquisition or
the opening up of new plants or operations.
4See ONS (2001, 2003) and Jones (2000, p.51). The local unit structure of enterprises is updated through
the Annual Register Inquiry (ARI) which samples large enterprises (100 or more employees before 2003, 50 in
later years) every year but only one in four of medium-sized enterprises (20-99 and 20-49 employees before and
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problematic, in particular when looking at year-to-year changes in ownership structure, as we
will do below. Second, most enterprises with multiple local units only report information on
employment at the enterprise level, preventing the implementation of our methodology at the
local unit level for these enterprises (see Criscuolo et al., 2003). Finally, local unit identifiers
are considered by the ONS to be less stable over time than enterprise identifiers (ONS, 2006).
That is, local units sometimes change their identifiers even though no corporate event has
occurred, creating problems of false exit in our methodology. In view of these problems, we have
abandoned the use of local unit data in our analysis, and focus on the enterprise group/enterprise
level of analysis for the rest of this paper. Given this choice, we will use the expressions
“enterprise group” and “firm”, and “enterprise” and “establishment” interchangeably in the
following.
2.2 The Annual Respondents Database (ARD)
The BSD contains information on turnover and employment at the enterprise level but not
on wages, capital investment or production inputs. The fact that employment is updated less
regularly than turnover data also implies that it is unsuitable for the calculation of even simple
labour productivity measures.5
In order to analyse the consequences of the choice of adjustment channel on a number of firm-
level variables, we merge the BSD with the Annual Respondents Database (ARD). The ARD
is based on a stratified sample taken from the IDBR and covers over 40,000 UK private sector
companies per year. Large businesses (those with more than 100 or 250 employees depending
on the year) are included every year, whereas random sampling is used for smaller businesses.
Among other variables, the ARD contains information on employment, wages, investment,
intermediate inputs, value added, gross outputs and industry affiliation (see Partington, 2001,
for a more detailed description). Table 2 presents a list of variables used in our analysis and
additional details on their construction.6
3 Consequences of the Choice of Adjustment Forms
We now investigate how the choice of adjustment channel correlates with a number of firm
characteristics commonly analysed in the literature, such as wages, profitability, or labour and
after 2003, respectively). For smaller enterprises, updating takes place on an ad-hoc basis only. In contrast, the
ownership information linking the enterprise group and the enterprise level is updated at least once a year (see
Dun & Bradstreet, 2001; ONS, 2006).
5See Criscuolo et al. (2003) and ONS (2001) for details. Employment information is frozen at the point at
which an enterprise arrives on the IDBR. Afterwards, it is only updated through the Annual Register Inquiry
(ARI) which mainly covers larger enterprises. To avoid underestimating the frequency of internal adjustments,
all results below use employment data from the ARD for the definition of internal adjustment which is updated
for all enterprises on a yearly basis. In practice, using BSD employment information for the definition of internal
adjustments yields similar results, most likely because the merged ARD-BSD sample mainly contains larger firms
for which the BSD updates employment regularly as well.
6Since the ARD sample is drawn from the IDBR (and thus the BSD), it is in principle straightforward to
merge the two. A slight complication arises from the fact that reporting in the ARD takes place at the so-called
reporting unit level, which is best thought of as being an intermediate level between local units and enterprises
(see Criscuolo et al., 2003). In practice, however, less than 5% of enterprises have multiple reporting units. For
such cases, we first aggregate the ARD information to the enterprise level before merging with the BSD.
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total factor productivity.
To fix ideas for the following, it is helpful to decompose the change of a firm-level variable
ywt (wages, productivity, etc.) into the contributions of the different adjustment channels. In
analogy to similar decompositions in the productivity literature (e.g., Foster et al., 2006), we
write:
∆ywt ≈
∑
e∈C+
set−1∆yet +
∑
e∈C+
(yet−1 − ye−t−1)∆set +
∑
e∈C+
∆yet∆set (1)
+
∑
e∈C−
set−1∆yet +
∑
e∈C−
(yet−1 − ye−t−1)∆set +
∑
e∈C−
∆yet∆set
+
∑
e∈N
set (yet − ye−t−1)−
∑
e∈X
set−1 (yet−1 − ye−t−1)
+
∑
e∈A
set (yet − ye−t−1)−
∑
e∈S
set−1 (yet−1 − ye−t−1)
where ∆ denotes log-changes between periods t − 1 and t, and set the share of enterprise e
in the total employment of enterprise group w in period t. The first two lines of (1) capture
the contribution of internal adjustment (C+ and C− stand for continuing and expanding, and
continuing and contracting, respectively). The first summand in each of these lines is the change
in the variable yet associated with internal expansion or contraction (∆yet), holding the share
(set−1) of the expanding or contracting enterprise constant. The second summand captures the
effect of changes in the share of enterprise e, given its initial level of y relative to the average
of the other enterprises which are part of the same enterprise group (yet−1− ye−t−1). The third
summand contains the covariance terms between changes in yet and set.
The third and fourth line of (1) capture the contribution of greenfield investment, exit,
acquisitions, and sales (N , X, A, and S, respectively). Specifically, the consequence of a
greenfield investment or an acquisition for the overall enterprise-group-level of variable y will
depend on the share of the new enterprise (set) and its level of y relative to the average of the
other enterprises in the same enterprise group (yet − ye−t−1). Likewise, whether an exit or sale
leads to an improvement in ywt will depend on how productive etc. the enterprise in question
was relative to the remaining enterprises in the same group.
The above discussion suggests that the following quantities are of interest to our analysis:
• “Composition effects”. Changes in ywt due to changes in the composition of the set of, or
the relative importance of, the enterprises making up an enterprise group. What matters
for ywt here is the level of variable yet of the enterprise undertaking an adjustment, relative
to all other enterprises in the same enterprise group (i.e., yet − ye−t−1, yet−1 − ye−t−1).
• “Change effects”. Changes in ywt due to changes in yet for existing and continuing enter-
prises. In the above decomposition, these are the changes in the enterprise-level variable
yet associated with internal expansion or contraction (∆yet).
In addition to these direct effects, Section 3.3 below will investigate whether there are also
indirect or spillover effects of the choice of adjustment channel of one enterprise on the remain-
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ing enterprises of the group. For example, Schoar (2002) finds that companies undertaking
acquisitions tend to neglect their existing plants whose productivity subsequently declines (the
“new toy effect”).
3.1 Composition Effects of the Choice of Adjustment Channel
We obtain estimates of the average difference between the enterprise undergoing a demographic
event and the other enterprises of the same group as follows. We first calculate the employment-
weighted average of y across all the enterprises of the enterprise group not undergoing the
demographic event in question (i.e., ye−t−1). We then subtract these averages from the level of
y of the enterprise group undergoing the demographic event (yet or yet−1), using an appropriate
lag structure as indicated in (1). This procedure yields one difference for each of the enterprise
groups and events for which we have sufficient data.
Table 3 shows estimates of the mean of these differences across enterprise groups, together
with the corresponding standard error and the significance level for a two-sided tests of whether
the mean is different from zero. We present results for a number of firm-level variables commonly
analysed in the literature: employment, wages, capital and intermediate input intensity, labour
and total factor productivity, unit labour costs and a measure of firm profitability (see Table 2
for details on variable definitions).7
As seen, new enterprises (column “birth”) and those recently acquired are significantly
smaller in terms of employment than the other enterprises in the same group. The same is
true for enterprises that exit or are sold off to other enterprise groups. In contrast, enterprises
undergoing internal expansions or contractions are 12% to 16% larger than the other enterprises
within the same group. Enterprises undergoing one of the four external adjustment forms
(birth, exit, acquisition, sale) also tend to be less productive, and have a lower intermediate
input and capital intensity (with the exception of new enterprises, which tend to be significantly
more capital intensive). There are no significant differences in profitability, however, with the
exception of enterprises which are sold off – these report profits of 20% less than the remaining
enterprises in the same group. Turning to the internal adjustment forms, contracting enterprises
show performance characteristics comparable to those being sold off, such as low productivity
and profitability. Expanding enterprises, on the other hand, tend to be slightly more productive,
pay higher wages, and have lower unit labour costs than the other enterprises in the same group.
In view of the ample evidence that firm dynamics are subject to selection mechanisms which
imply that unsuccessful enterprises decline and exit, these results strike us as very reasonable. In
particular, enterprises which see their employment reduced, are sold off, or are closed down, show
a number of negative performance characteristics, such as low productivity and profitability.
The finding that acquired enterprises are comparatively smaller and less productive is also
consistent with existing findings in the literature (e.g., Maksimovic and Philipps, 2001) and
consistent with the view that the market for corporate control serves to reallocate assets to
7Note that we need information on the relevant firm-level variables for the enterprise undergoing a demographic
event and at least one additional enterprise in the same enterprise group. The fact that the ARD is only
approximately a 5% sample of the IDBR implies that this requirement leads to only a relatively small sample for
the results presented in Table 3. We will come back to this issue below.
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more productive owners.
3.2 Change Effects on Existing And Continuing Enterprises
Estimates of the average log-change in the enterprise-level variable yet associated with internal
expansion or contraction (∆yet) can be obtained via simple dummy variable regressions of
∆yet on binary indicators for internal expansion/contraction. We use enterprises which neither
expand nor contract employment between periods t− 1 and t as the omitted category in these
regressions, so that all changes are expressed relative to this group. For comparison with
the existing literature, we also include enterprises undergoing an acquisition or sale. Panel A
of Table 4 presents results for the same firm-level variables used previously. We control for
industry-year fixed effects in all regressions, so that results rely on within-sector-year variation
only. Similar to related contributions in the literature (Maksimovic and Philipps (2001) and
Schoar (2002), in particular), we thus make the identifying assumption that, after controlling for
industry-year fixed effects, enterprises with unchanged employment represent a suitable control
group for the other demographic events.8
As seen, the average internal expansion increases employment by around 13%, whereas the
average contraction decreases employment by 15%. Regarding the other variables, the general
pattern is that internal expansions tend to reduce capital and intermediate input intensity,
wages, profits and labour and total factor productivity (unit labour costs remain unchanged).
Internal contractions have almost exactly the opposite pattern. They increase capital interme-
diate input intensity and all productivity measures. Profitability also improves, although an
increase in wages means that unit labour costs actually increase slightly.
Patterns are less pronounced for both acquisitions and sales, but some interesting patterns
emerge here as well. For example, similar to Maksimovic and Philipps (2001) and Schoar (2002)
we find that acquired enterprises subsequently increase their productivity, although this effect
is only significant for one of the TFP measures. Capital and intermediate intensity, wages and
profits all increase as well, although again these effects are not always statistically significant.
Not surprisingly, sales have similar effects but with lower levels of significance.9
Besides serving as input into the decomposition (1), these results allow for some interesting
comparisons with the existing literature, which usually focuses on only a subset of the channels
analysed here. For example, our results show that while asset transfers via M&As are not always
associated with significant productivity gains, internal expansions actually reduce productiv-
8It is of course possible that there are pre-existing level or trend differences which make enterprise groups
select into a particular adjustment channel. In this case, identifying truly causal effects would have to rely on
sources of exogenous variation in the choice of adjustment channels. Unfortunately, finding suitable instruments
which are both relevant and arguably exogenous proved to be very difficult with the data at hand. But even if
the reader is sceptical about a causal interpretation of our results, we think that the results presented here should
also be of interest when interpreted as correlations. We also note that papers such as Maksimovic and Philipps
(2001) and Schoar (2002) face comparable problems but still (implicitly) insist on a causual interpretation of
their results.
9Note that while both “acquisitions” and “sales” refer to enterprises which change owners, the underlying sets
of observations are different, explaining the differences in Table 4. Acquisitions refer to the buying of enterprises
or enterprise groups by existing enterprise groups, whereas sales only include selloffs by enterprise groups which
continue to exist. This distinction implies, for example, that spin-offs will not be included under acquisitions, since
they result in the creation of a new enterprise group. Likewise, whole-firm acquisitions result in the disappearance
of the acquired enterprise group, and the acquired enterprises are thus not part of the definition of sales.
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ity, with the difference between the two expansion forms being highly statistically significant.
This demonstrates that when analysing the consequences of corporate events such as acquisi-
tions, the choice of control group is crucial. In the previous example, both acquisitions and
internal expansions serve the purpose of increasing overall firm size, and might imply similar
adjustment processes to the operations of a firm. It would thus seem natural to use internally
expanding enterprises as a control group in the estimation of the effects of acquisitions. As our
results demonstrate, this choice would let acquisitions appear in a much better light than when
compared to, for example, enterprises not undergoing any change.
One concern with the results presented in Panel A is that the effects for internal expan-
sions and contractions might be driven by particularities of the data collection. In particular,
employment in the ARD is measured at a given point in time, whereas sales, wages and value
added are period averages. Given that we define expansions and contractions as an increase or
decrease in employment, respectively, any measure which has employment in the denominator
might change for purely mechanical reasons. For example, if an enterprise is sampled just after
having expanded employment, its reported value added will still mainly refer to the previous
period; it would thus not be surprising to detect a decrease in measured labour productivity.
To address this issue, Panel B reports change effects over a two-year period, i.e., from t-1
to t+1, which ensures that we measure genuine changes only. As seen, the magnitude of the
estimated effects for internal expansion and contractions are indeed much reduced, even though
the sign pattern remains the same as before. Since this might be a sign of the presence of purely
mechanical effects in Panel A, we will work with these new estimates in the following.10
3.3 Indirect Effects on Existing And Continuing Enterprises
A further potential consequence of the choice of adjustment channel is the effect on other
continuing enterprises within the same enterprise group. For example, Schoar (2002) presents
evidence that companies undertaking acquisitions tend to neglect their existing plants, whose
productivity subsequently declines (the “new toy effect”).
To investigate such spillover effects, we run regressions of the following form:
∆yet = α+ β1DC+,et + β2DC−,et +ΣEEGE,et + dst + εet (2)
where E ∈ {N,X,A, S,C+, C−} denotes the set of demographic events and EGE,et the corre-
sponding dummy variables, taking a value of one if any enterprise within an enterprise group
undergoes the event in question. For example, if enterprise group A has five enterprises in
period t − 1 and opens an additional enterprise in period t, we will have EGN,et = 1 for all of
the original enterprises in period t. We also include additional dummies to control for the direct
effect of demographic events affecting these enterprises. Since the regression sample underlying
(2) contains only enterprises which are part of the same enterprise group in both periods t− 1
and t, the set of relevant demographic events is limited to internal expansions/contractions
10An alternative explanation is that the stronger effect in Panel A might be due to adjustment frictions, i.e.,
the fact that enterprises require a certain amount of time to translate increases in employment into increases in
sales, value added, etc. Since it is impossible to distinguish between these two effects in our data, we prefer to
work with the more conservative estimates of Panel B.
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(DC+,et and DC−,et; the omitted category are enterprises without changes in employment). We
also include industry-year fixed effects to control for omitted sectoral-level variables determining
both the choice of adjustment channel and the evolution of the variable y in question. Finally,
to avoid purely mechanical effects due to the data collection process as discussed above, we also
estimate effects over the longer period t− 1 to t+ 1.
As the results in Table 5 indicate, the indirect effects of demographic events are only im-
portant for internal expansions and contractions. The former tend to reduce intermediate and
capital intensity, wages, productivity, and profitability of enterprises in the same group, whereas
the latter have exactly the opposite effect. Interestingly, the sign pattern for acquisition and
sales is consistent with the “new toy effect”discussed by Schoar (2002). However, this effect and
the effects of the other corporate events are very small, and mostly statistically insignificant.
We also note that the sum of the direct and indirect effects reported in Table 5 for internal ex-
pansions and contractions is similar in magnitude to the direct effects reported in Table 4. Thus,
we conclude that adding indirect effects is unlikely to change any of the subsequent results, and
we therefore continue to focus on direct effect only.
3.4 Contribution of Adjustment Channels to Changes in Firm-Level Vari-
ables
We now combine the results from the previous sections with the decomposition proposed in (1)
to shed light on the contribution of our adjustment channels to changes in the enterprise group
level variables analysed here. These results will tell us, for example, what fraction of the average
labour productivity growth of UK enterprise groups can be associated with the creation of new
enterprises, as opposed to changes in existing enterprises.
Recall from (1) that we need the changes in the variable of interest (y) associated with the
different adjustment channels, as well as the employment shares of the enterprises undergoing
a given demographic event. A problem in this context is that the matching procedure between
the ARD and the BSD only results in a small subset of enterprise groups with a complete set of
enterprises – which is of course needed to calculate the employment shares in (1). The reason
for this is that sampling in the ARD takes place at a scale equivalent to the enterprise level (not
the enterprise group level), and the ARD covers less than 5% of the enterprises in the BSD in a
given year. Consequently, we only have the full set of enterprises for less than 2% of enterprise
groups.
To make progress, we thus use employment shares from the BSD (where coverage is close to
complete, but we only have information on employment and turnover) with our earlier estimate
of the average changes in y associated with the different adjustment forms. That is, we rewrite
(1) as:
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∆̂ywt =
∑
e∈C+
set−1∆̂yet +
∑
e∈C+
( ̂yet−1 − ye−t−1)∆set + ∑
e∈C+
∆̂yet∆set (3)
+
∑
e∈C−
set−1∆̂yet +
∑
e∈C−
( ̂yet−1 − ye−t−1)∆set + ∑
e∈C−
∆̂yet∆set
+
∑
e∈N
set
( ̂yet − ye−t−1)−∑
e∈X
set−1
( ̂yet−1 − ye−t−1)
+
∑
e∈A
set
( ̂yet − ye−t−1)−∑
e∈S
set−1
( ̂yet−1 − ye−t−1)
where hats above the variables indicate quantities estimated in the last sections. For example,
we found that exiting enterprises have a labour productivity which is on average 14.5% lower
than the remaining enterprises of the same enterprise group (see Table 3). We thus set
−
∑
e∈X
set−1
( ̂yet−1 − ye−t−1) = −∑
e∈X
set−1 × (−0.145)
where set−1, the employment share of the exiting enterprise, is now calculated from the BSD
data. Implicitly, we are thus making the assumption that the sample used for the estimations
in the previous sections is representative of the BSD in terms of the effects associated with the
different adjustment channels. To make this assumption more plausible, we only keep those
enterprise groups in the BSD from which at least one enterprise can be matched to the ARD
at some point in our sample. This makes the set of enterprise groups used in our analysis more
comparable to the type of enterprise groups represented in the ARD.11
For each enterprise group in the BSD, and for each left-hand side variable y, the decom-
position in (3) yields a predicted growth rate of y, as well as the contributions of the different
adjustment channels. In the first panel of Table 6, we display the average across enterprise
groups for each of the elements in (3). Note that if a given channel is not active for a given
enterprise group, the corresponding entries are zero. Thus, the figures in Table 6 capture both
the frequency of use of an adjustment channel, and its quantitative importance if it is used.
To disentangle these two effects from each other, Table 7 presents averages excluding zero con-
tributions. This demonstrates that external adjustments, if they take place, are at least as
important as internal expansion and contraction. Indeed, the effect of enterprise sales and exits
are usually an order of magnitude bigger. Thus, despite their relatively infrequent occurrence,
they contribute to a large degree to the overall changes in our firm-level variables of interest,
as shown in Table 8. This table normalises the individual entries of Table 6 by the sum (in
absolute terms) of all adjustment forms. Depending on the variable in question, the external
adjustment forms (in particular exits and sales) account for around 50% of the overall mean
changes at the enterprise group level. External adjustment forms are particularly important
for growth in total factor productivity, where they account for 70%-90% of the overall mean
change. While there are of course important differences in terms of the underlying data and the
11Given that these groups tend to be relatively large in terms of employment, the following results are best
thought to apply mainly to larger firms. As is true in the UK as in other countries, however, these firms make
up the majority of economic activity.
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decomposition approaches used, this dominance of external adjustment is reminiscent of recent
findings in the productivity literature such as Disney et al. (2003) and Foster et al. (2006).
4 Conclusions
We investigated the consequences of firms’ choices of expansion and contraction channels, using
unique business register data for the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2005. In contrast to
contributions in the existing literature, our data enabled us to distinguish between all three
principal adjustment channels firms can use to expand or contract the scale and scope of their
operations: changes at existing establishments (“internal adjustment”), greenfield investments
and disinvestment, and acquisitions and sell-offs.
We documented that the choice of a particular adjustment channel is associated with sub-
stantial differences in firm-level performance. These differences arise from what we named
composition effects (i.e., effects arising from performance differences between existing and new
plants or plants shut down or sold off, respectively) and effects arising from the choice of adjust-
ment channel on a firm’s existing plants (“change effects”). In terms of aggregate importance,
we show that the two external adjustment forms (greenfield and M&As) account for at least
50% of the changes in aggregate wages, profits and productivity associated with firm expansions
and contractions.
We believe that these findings have potentially important implications for the design of
economic policy and the modelling of firm adjustment processes. For example, the finding that
external adjustments through M&As are an important driver of productivity growth provides
suggestive evidence that an active market for corporate control plays the beneficial role claimed
by authors such as Jensen (1993) and should thus not be unduly regulated. Likewise, our results
also suggest that keeping open poorly performing plants (through subsidies and other state
interventions) may remove an important contribution to productivity growth. Very interesting
in this respect is also the finding that internal expansions seem to be associated with much
stronger decreases in performance measures such as wages and productivity than expansions
via the acquisition of new plants. This raises the obvious question why firms rely on internal
expansions at all, and what type of barriers prevent more successful acquisitions from taking
place. Finally, our results should also be helpful for the construction of more sophisticated
models of firm dynamics which take into account the existence of multiple adjustment channels
with different impacts on firm performance. Such models would of course also be useful to
further address policy questions such as what effect an increased regulation of the use of certain
adjustment channels might have (such as a more restrictive competition policy, to give but one
example).
12
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Table 1: Definition of Demographic Events 
 
Event 
Change in Enterprise 
Group Identifier, 
Period t-1 to t 
Change in Enterprise 
Identifier, 
Period t-1 to t 
Change in Enterprise 
Employment, 
Period t-1 to t 
Change in Enterprise 
Group Employment, 
Period t-1 to t 
Internal Expansion None None Increased Increased 
Internal Contraction None None Decreased Decreased 
Greenfield 
Investment 
N/A (enterprise did not 
exist in t-1, so did not 
have an enterprise group 
identifier) 
Enterprise identifier 
appears in data for the 
first time 
N/A (enterprise did not 
exist in period t-1) Increased 
Greenfield 
Disinvestment 
N/A (enterprise exits, so 
no enterprise group 
identifier in period t-1) 
Enterprise identifier 
disappears from data 
N/A (enterprise does not 
exist in period t) Decreased 
Acquisition 
Changes to the 
enterprise group identifier 
of the new owner 
Unchanged Unchanged* Increased 
Sell-off 
Changes to the 
enterprise group identifier 
of the new owner 
Unchanged Unchanged* Decreased 
Notes: Table shows the definition of demographic events used in the paper. See text for details. 
(*) If employment changes during an acquisition or sell-off, this is coded as an internal expansion/contraction of the new owner (only the initial 
employment of the acquired/sold-off enterprise in period t-1 is counted as a size change through M&As). 
 
Table 2: List of ARD Variables Used 
Variables Definitions and Sources 
Gross output  Gross output (£ thousands) is deflated by 2-digit annual gross 
output price indices from the EUKLEMS project (base 
year=1995). 
Gross value 
added  
Gross value added at factor cost (£ thousands) is deflated using 
2-digit annual value added price indices from the EUKLEMS 
project (base year=1995).  
Employment Employment is measured as the headcount of the number of 
employees. 
Labour 
productivity 
Defined as gross value added at factor cost in constant 1995 
prices divided by employment. 
Wages per 
employee 
Defined as total labour costs divided by the number of 
employees. Total labour costs (£ thousands) is deflated using 
the average earnings index from the ONS (base year=1995). 
Intermediate 
input intensity 
Total intermediate input in constant 1995 prices divided by the 
number of employees. Total intermediate input is proxied by total 
purchases of goods materials / service (£ thousands), from the 
ARD. It is deflated using 2-digit annual intermediate input price 
deflators from the EUKLEMS project.  
Capital 
intensity 
Capital stock in constant 1995 prices divided by the number of 
employees. Data on capital stock was obtained from Criscuolo 
and Martin (2009). 
TFP TFP is obtained using two approaches: the factor cost approach 
and the OLS approach. The factor cost approach obtains TFPFS 
as logTFPFS = logy - αLlogL - αKlogK - αIlogI, where Y is deflated 
gross output, L is employment, I is deflated intermediate input 
and αL, αK, and αI are the  factor shares of labour, capital and 
intermediate inputs, respectively, at the 3-digit industrial level; αL 
is computed as the share of wages in gross output; αI is 
computed as the share of intermediate inputs in gross output; αK 
is computed as the residual factor share (i.e., 1- αL - αI).  
The OLS approach obtains logTFPOLS from the residual of 
regressions of the log of deflated gross output on the logs of 
employment, deflated capital stock, deflated intermediate inputs 
and time fixed effects at the 2-digit industrial level.  
Operating 
profits per 
employee 
Defined as gross value added per employee minus wages per 
employee. Both gross value added and wages are in constant 
1995 prices (see above). 
Unit labour 
costs 
Wages per employee divided by labour productivity. Both wages 
and labour productivity are in constant 1995 prices (see above). 
Table 3: Composition Effects of the Choice of Adjustment Channel (1997-2005) 
 
 Birth Exit Acquisition Sale Internal Expansion 
Internal 
Contraction 
-0.050 -0.145 -0.021 -0.146 0.009 -0.065 Labour 
productivity (0.052) (0.034)*** (0.015) (0.027)*** (0.017) (0.016)*** 
-1.143 -1.099 -0.665 -0.913 0.116 0.159 Employment 
(0.097)*** (0.055)*** (0.028)*** (0.052)*** (0.035)*** (0.030)*** 
0.025 -0.034 -0.031 -0.090 0.022 -0.038 Wages per 
employee (0.031) (0.020)* (0.009)*** (0.016)*** (0.010)** (0.010)*** 
Intermediate 
input intensity  -0.310 -0.217 -0.083 -0.115 0.018 -0.117 
 (0.065)*** (0.043)*** (0.021)*** (0.038) (0.025) (0.023)*** 
0.369 -0.249 -0.052 -0.128 -0.031 -0.108 Capital 
intensity (0.079)*** (0.055)*** (0.026)** (0.043)*** (0.029) (0.027)*** 
-0.071 -0.026 -0.018 -0.059 -0.023 -0.054 TFP (factor 
share)  (0.029)** (0.019) (0.010)* (0.017)*** (0.010)** (0.009)*** 
-0.053 -0.033 -0.019 -0.030 0.013 -0.012 TFP (OLS) 
(0.026)** (0.014)** (0.007)*** (0.012)** (0.007)* (0.007)* 
-0.024 -0.079 -0.021 -0.198 -0.023 -0.159 Operating 
profits per 
employee (0.111) (0.055) (0.026) (0.046)*** (0.028) (0.026)*** 
-0.028 -0.012 -0.048 -0.017 -0.054 -0.032 Unit labour 
costs (0.046) (0.025) (0.012)*** (0.020) (0.013)*** (0.012)*** 
Observations 234 to 379 623 to 951 2336 to 3236 885 to 1205 
2435 to 
3301 
2799 to 
3842 
Notes: Table shows average log differences between enterprises undergoing an adjustment form and other enterprises in 
the same enterprise group. They are derived from simple descriptive OLS regressions. Figures in brackets denote robust 
standard errors clustered at the enterprise level. The dependent variable in these regressions is computed as log(Ye)-
log(wmean(Ye-)), where Ye refers to the value of the dependent variable Y of interest for the enterprise e undergoing a 
corporate event, and wmean(Ye-) refers to the employment-weighted mean of Y across all other enterprises in the 
enterprise group apart from enterprise e.  *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Table 4 Change Effects on Existing and Continuing Enterprises (1997-2005) 
 
Panel A: Change Effects from t-1 to t 
 Labour 
productivity 
Employment Wages 
per 
employee 
Intermediate 
input 
intensity 
Capital 
intensity 
TFP (factor 
share) 
TFP (OLS) Operating 
profits per 
employee 
Unit 
labor 
costs 
-0.066 0.133 -0.067 -0.078 -0.098 -0.007 -0.017 -0.063 -0.005 Internal 
Expansion (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.012)*** (0.005) 
0.092 -0.152 0.100 0.102 0.148 0.015 0.031 0.075 0.010 Internal 
Contraction (0.006)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.012)*** (0.005)* 
0.013 -0.013 0.015 0.007 0.021 0.004 0.008 0.013 -0.003 Acquisition 
(0.009) (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.007) (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.004)* (0.017) (0.008) 
-0.001 -0.009 0.001 0.006 0.017 -0.001 0.002 0.028 0.003 Sale 
(0.009) (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.018) (0.008) 
Observations 82321 87899 87138 86813 72726 70741 70593 65652 80395 
Panel B: Change effects from t-1 to t+1 
 Labour 
productivity 
Employment Wages 
per 
employee 
Intermediate 
input 
intensity 
Capital 
intensity 
TFP (factor 
share) 
TFP (OLS) Operating 
profits per 
employee 
Unit 
labor 
costs 
-0.020 0.118 -0.021 -0.021 -0.061 0.001 -0.002 -0.021 0.001 Internal 
Expansion (0.011)* (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)** (0.009)*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.010) 
0.061 -0.138 0.047 0.068 0.127 -0.001 0.013 0.067 -0.005 Internal 
Contraction (0.011)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.006) (0.006)** (0.023)*** (0.010) 
0.015 0.000 0.014 0.007 0.021 0.008 0.016 0.009 -0.008 Acquisition 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.007)* (0.013) (0.012)* (0.008) (0.007)** (0.029) (0.013) 
0.010 -0.018 0.003 0.035 0.019 -0.003 -0.000 0.054 -0.003 Sale 
(0.012) (0.007)** (0.006) (0.010)*** (0.009)** (0.006) (0.006) (0.025)** (0.011) 
Observations 36206 39206 38945 38940 31273 30273 30243 28358 35257 
Notes: Table shows the effects of the corporate events listed in the first column on existing and continuing enterprises. Results are estimated using OLS 
regressions with industry-year fixed effects. Figures in brackets are robust standard errors clustered at the enterprise level. Each column denotes a separate 
regression, where the growth rates of the variables of interest are regressed on the event dummies. In panel A, the growth rate is computed as the log difference 
from the period before the event to the year of the event. In panel B, it is the log difference from the period before the event to one year after the event. The omitted 
group are enterprises that do not engage in any expansion or contraction activity. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
  
Table 5: Indirect Effects on Existing and Continuing Enterprises (1997-2005) 
 
Panel A: Indirect effects from t-1 to t 
 
Labour 
productivity Employment
Wages 
per 
employee 
Intermediate 
input 
intensity 
Capital 
intensity 
TFP (factor 
share) TFP (OLS) 
Operating 
profits 
per 
employee
Unit 
labor 
costs 
-0.039 0.121 -0.046 -0.055 -0.076 0.003 -0.006 -0.010 -0.013 Internal 
Expansion 
(Enterprise) (0.010) (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.005) (0.004) (0.020) (0.009) 
0.062 -0.142 0.083 0.092 0.137 0.008 0.025 0.062 0.013 Internal 
Contraction 
(Enterprise) (0.010)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)* (0.004)*** (0.020)*** (0.009) 
0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.012 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.014 -0.004 Birth 
(EG) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)* (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.003) (0.016) (0.006) 
-0.013 0.003 0.002 0.010 0.009 -0.004 -0.000 -0.010 0.004 Exit 
(EG) (0.007)* (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)* (0.004)** (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.006) 
-0.004 0.001 0.000 0.006 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 Acquisition 
(EG) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.005) 
-0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.000 Sale 
(EG) (0.006) (0.002)** (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)* (0.013) (0.005) 
0.034 -0.012 0.018 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.009 0.022 -0.004 Internal 
Contraction 
(EG) (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)* (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.017) (0.007) 
-0.029 0.011 -0.025 -0.026 -0.026 -0.011 -0.011 -0.049 0.006 Internal 
Expansion 
(EG) (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.016)*** (0.007) 
Observations 68247 72777 72170 71897 59210 57559 57437 54610 66703 
Table continued on the next page 
 
Panel B: Indirect effects from t-1 to t+1 
 Labour 
productivity 
 
Employment
(%) 
Wages 
per 
employee 
(%) 
Intermediate 
input 
intensity 
(%) 
Capital 
intensity 
(%) 
TFP (factor 
share) 
(%) 
TFP (OLS) 
(%) 
Operating 
profits 
per 
employee
Unit 
labor 
costs 
-0.029 0.128 -0.016 -0.003 -0.047 -0.000 -0.009 -0.024 0.011 Internal 
Expansion 
(Enterprise) (0.017)* (0.009)*** (0.008)* (0.015) (0.014)*** (0.009) (0.008) (0.034) (0.015) 
0.046 -0.128 0.039 0.047 0.128 0.002 0.008 0.021 -0.008 Internal 
Contraction 
(Enterprise) (0.017)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.009) (0.008) (0.034) (0.015) 
0.012 -0.008 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.025 -0.009 Birth 
(EG) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.024) (0.010) 
-0.003 0.010 -0.000 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.002 Exit 
(EG) (0.010) (0.006)* (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.009) 
-0.014 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.032 0.014 Acquisition 
(EG) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.018)* (0.008)*
-0.003 -0.010 -0.007 -0.002 0.007 0.001 -0.004 0.003 -0.002 Sale 
(EG) (0.009) (0.005)* (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.019) (0.008) 
0.014 -0.009 0.007 0.020 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.047 0.004 Internal 
Contraction 
(EG) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)** (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.025)* (0.011) 
0.006 -0.010 -0.009 -0.024 -0.013 0.007 0.005 -0.010 -0.011 Internal 
Expansion 
(EG) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)** (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.024) (0.011) 
Observations 28519 30824 30646 30624 23909 23126 23115 22308 27800 
Notes: Table shows the indirect effects of demographic events. The sample comprises plants that have been within an enterprise group (EG) for at least two 
consecutive periods surrounding the demographic event in question. Results are estimated using OLS regressions with industry-year fixed effects. Figures in 
brackets denote robust standard errors clustered at the enterprise level. See text for details of the estimated specification. The omitted group are enterprises that 
do not engage in any expansion or contraction activity. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 6: Firm-Level Decompositions (1997-2005) 
Average value for each decomposition term (including zeros) 
 
Component 
Labour 
productivity 
(%) 
Wages per 
employee 
(%) 
Intermed. 
input 
intensity 
(%) 
Capital 
intensity 
(%) 
TFP (factor 
share) (%) 
TFP (OLS) 
(%) 
Operating 
profits per 
employee 
(%) 
Unit labor 
costs 
(%) 
Within Effect (internal 
expansion) -0.43 -0.45 -0.45 -1.31 0.02 -0.04 -0.45 0.02 
Between Effect (internal 
expansion) 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
Cross  (internal 
expansion) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Within Effect (internal 
contraction) 0.98 0.76 1.09 2.01 -0.02 0.21 1.08 -0.08 
Between Effect (internal 
contraction) 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 
Cross  (internal 
ontraction) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Contribution of birth -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Contribution of exit 1.26 0.30 1.89 2.17 0.23 0.29 0.69 0.10 
Contribution of acquisition -0.15 -0.22 -0.59 -0.37 -0.13 -0.13 -0.15 -0.34 
Contribution of sale 0.83 0.51 0.65 0.73 0.33 0.17 1.12 0.10 
Avg. predicted change in 
decomposed variable 2.50 0.91 2.56 3.27 0.42 0.49 2.30 -0.23 
Observations 445134 445136 445133 445135 445136 445138 445136 445135 
Notes: Table shows the average contribution of each component in the first column to changes in the variables listed in the top row. Figures are in percentages. 
The computation of each component includes cases where the event in question does not take place (i.e., has a contribution of zero). 
  
Table 7: Firm-Level  Decompositions (1997-2005) 
Average value for each decomposition term (excluding zeros) 
 
Component 
Labour 
productivity 
(%) 
Wages 
per 
employee 
(%) 
Intermed. 
input 
intensity 
(%) 
Capital 
intensity 
(%) 
TFP 
(factor 
share) (%) 
TFP (OLS)
(%) 
Operating 
profits per 
employee 
(%) 
Unit labor 
costs 
(%) 
% of non-
zero obs.  
 
Within Effect (internal 
expansion) -0.94 -0.98 -0.98 -2.89 0.05 -0.09 -0.98 0.05 45.49 
Between Effect (internal 
expansion) 0.08 0.20 0.16 -0.28 -0.21 0.12 -0.21 -0.49 6.91 
Cross  (internal 
expansion) -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.28 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 6.91 
Within Effect (internal 
contraction) 2.78 2.15 3.09 5.70 -0.05 0.60 3.05 -0.23 35.30 
Between Effect (internal 
contraction) 0.29 0.17 0.52 0.48 0.24 0.05 0.71 0.14 6.29 
Cross  (internal 
contraction) -0.13 -0.10 -0.15 -0.27 0.00 -0.03 -0.15 0.01 6.29 
Contribution of birth -0.81 0.40 -5.00 5.95 -1.14 -0.85 -0.39 -0.45 1.28 
Contribution of exit 11.40 2.67 17.06 19.58 2.04 2.59 6.21 0.94 11.08 
Contribution of acquisition -1.58 -2.33 -6.25 -3.91 -1.35 -1.43 -1.58 -3.61 9.44 
Contribution of sale 9.58 5.90 7.54 8.40 3.87 1.97 12.99 1.12 8.65 
Avg. predicted change in 
decomposed variable 2.50 0.91 2.56 3.27 0.42 0.49 2.30 -0.23 100.00 
Total number of 
observations (zeros and 
non-zeros) 
445134 445136 445133 445135 445136 445138 445136 445135  
Notes: Table shows the average contribution of each component in the first column to changes in the variables listed in the top row. Figures are in percentages. 
The computation of each component excludes cases where the event in question does not take place. 
Table 8: Firm-Level Decompositions (1997-2005) 
(Average value for each decomposition term, expressed as a fraction of sum of all terms (in absolute values) 
 
Component Labour 
productivity 
(%) 
Wages per 
employee 
(%) 
Intermed. 
input 
intensity 
(%) 
Capital 
intensity 
(%) 
TFP (factor 
share) 
(%) 
TFP (OLS) 
(%) 
Operating 
profits per 
employee 
(%) 
Unit labor 
costs 
(%) 
Within Effect (internal 
expansion) 11.53 19.67 9.34 19.46 2.75 4.87 12.56 3.05 
Between Effect (internal 
expansion) 0.15 0.61 0.24 0.29 1.87 0.94 0.41 4.88 
Cross  (internal 
expansion) 0.17 0.29 0.14 0.29 0.04 0.07 0.19 0.05 
Within Effect (internal 
contraction) 26.54 33.33 22.77 29.79 2.12 24.28 30.20 11.77 
Between Effect (internal 
contraction) 0.49 0.47 0.68 0.45 1.95 0.38 1.25 1.29 
Cross  (internal 
contraction) 0.23 0.28 0.19 0.25 0.02 0.21 0.26 0.10 
Contribution of birth 0.28 0.23 1.33 1.13 1.90 1.25 0.14 0.83 
Contribution of exit 34.16 13.01 39.41 32.12 29.36 32.98 19.30 15.05 
Contribution of acquisition 4.03 9.67 12.29 5.47 16.58 15.48 4.18 49.09 
Contribution of sale 22.41 22.44 13.61 10.76 43.41 19.53 31.52 13.89 
Avg. predicted change in 
decomposed variable 2.50 0.91 2.56 3.27 0.42 0.49 2.30 -0.23 
Observations 445134 445136 445133 445135 445136 445138 445136 445135 
Notes: Table shows the average contribution of each component in the first column to changes in the variables listed in the top row. Contributions are expressed as 
the absolute value of the corresponding figure in Table 13, divided by the sum of (the absolute value of) all contributions.  
  
  
 
